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Abstract
The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control called
the attention in March 2012 to the risk of measles in Ukraine for the
visitors of the 2012 UEFA European Football Championship. Large
populations of supporters travelled to various locations in Poland and
Ukraine, depending on the schedule of Euro 2012 and the outcome
of the games, possibly carrying the disease from one location to an-
other. In the present study, we propose a novel two-phase multitype
branching process with immigration for the mathematical modelling
of the risk of epidemic outbreaks in connection with large-scale sports
related mass gathering events. By analytic means, we calculate the ex-
pected number and the variance of imported cases, and the probability
of a major outbreak caused by them in the home countries. Applying
our model for the case of Euro 2012 we demonstrate that the results of
the football games can highly inuence the risk of measles outbreaks in
the home countries of supporters. To prevent imported epidemics, it
should be emphasized that vaccinating the travellers would most e-
ciently reduce the epidemic risk, while requiring the minimum doses of
vaccines as compared to other vaccination strategies. Our theoretical
framework can be applied to forthcoming sport tournaments as well.
1
1 Introduction
The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control reported a measles
outbreak in Ukraine with more than 11,000 cases from the beginning of 2012
until the end of June 2012 [1, 2]. The 2012 UEFA European Championship
(Euro 2012) took place in Ukraine and Poland between 8 June and 1 July
2012, attracting several hundreds of thousands of football fans to these coun-
tries [3]. Susceptible visitors not only had a high risk of being infected, but
also geographically propagating the epidemic to other countries.
We introduce a discrete time Markov chain model, which is an adap-
tation of a multitype Galton{Watson process with immigration to give a
mathematical model for the evolution of the epidemic. Thus we calculate
the risk of epidemics connected to sports related mass gathering events. Our
model consists of two parts, the rst one describing the spread of the disease
during the championship in the host country, while the second part models
the spread of the disease by fans returning to their home countries.
We apply our model for the special case of measles epidemics in Ukraine
during the Euro 2012. Four of the eight host cities of this championship
are in Ukraine (Kiev, Kharkiv, Lviv and Donetsk); one of these { Lviv
{ is situated in the western region where the prevalence is the highest and
vaccination coverage remained the lowest in the country. Games of the group
phase took place in the four Ukrainian cities for groups B and D including
Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Portugal and Ukraine, England, France,
and Sweden [4]. Two of the quarternals, one of the seminals as well as the
nal took place in Ukraine, so Spain and Italy also played some games in
Ukraine. The suboptimal measles vaccination coverage in many European
countries poses a risk of measles epidemics caused by fans returning from
Euro 2012. Here we study the impact of dierent outcomes of Euro 2012 on
the probability of post-tournament measles epidemics in the participating
countries, and compare the eectiveness of dierent vaccination strategies
by target host in reducing the risk of imported epidemics in other countries
after Euro 2012. We discuss the applicability of our approach to other future
events as well.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe
the general mathematical model. In section 3 we compute the probability
of major epidemic in France after Euro 2012, while in section 4 we compare
the results with Euro 2008. Finally, we close with a discussion on the appli-
cability of our model for other sports related mass gathering events. In the
Appendix we calculate explicitly the expected number and the variance of
infectious cases imported to the home country by supporters.
2
2 Methods
Since the supporter group spends a relatively short time in the infected area,
it is possible that nobody gets infected, in which case there is no increased
chance for epidemic in the home country. It is also clear that the risk of
a huge epidemic is larger when 5 infected individuals arrive home (maybe
to dierent parts of the country) than in the case when only 1 infectious
supporter arrives. The fact that the number of infected supporters is 0, 1 or
5, is just a matter of chance, thus a deterministic model does not serve for
our purposes in this case. It is well-known (see [5]) that early stages of an
epidemic in a large population can be approximated by branching processes,
where having a descendant means infecting somebody. This exactly ts to
our model, because in the host country the supporters spend short time
(up to a month, say), and after returning to the home country we are only
interested in the probability of a major epidemic, i.e. in the early stage of a
possible epidemic. To determine the nal number of infectious individuals
and/or the duration of the epidemic a mixture of a stochastic and a deter-
ministic model is more appropriate. For general use of stochastic epidemic
models we refer to a recent survey by Britton [5].
To describe the importation dynamics in the simplest manner, as a math-
ematical model we propose a branching process with immigration. For sim-
plicity, consider a single supporter population S from a country F which
follows the matches of the team during the tournament, and ignore the in-
teraction with other supporter groups. They can contract the disease from
the local population or from each other. We dene a discrete time Markov
chain model, which is an adaptation of a multitype Galton{Watson pro-
cess with immigration. We say that an individual is of type-j if he/she
contracted the infection exactly j days ago. The model is divided into two
phases: the rst phase takes T days and corresponds to the time spent in the
host country, while the second phase describes the process upon returning
to the home country. Let m be the mean latent period and k be the mean
infectious period of the disease (in days), i.e. a newly infected individual
becomes infectious only after m days, and remains infectious for additional
k days. We assume these as constants. Denote by Xt the integer vector of
infected individuals in population S on day t  T where Xt(j), the number
of type-j individuals, is the number of infected individuals in population
S who got infected j days ago, j = 1; 2; : : : ;m + k   1. The evolution is
the following. On day t+ 1 the newly infected individuals, i.e. type-1 indi-
viduals, can originate from the local population (immigrants), or from an
S-individual who is infectious on day t + 1 (which means that he/she got
infected at least m + 1 and at most m + k days ago), thus is of type  m
on day t (osprings). We assume that the force of infection from the local
population to S is a constant during the rst phase, and that the daily inci-
dence produced by an infectious member of S is also constant. Finally, for
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j > 1, type-j individuals arise only by getting one day older. After Phase
1, the infected vector XT returns to the home country, and each infected
individual independently starts a simple single type Galton{Watson process.
In the following we describe the exact mathematical model.
2.1 Phase 1
Let Xt = (Xt(1); : : : ; Xt(d)) be a multitype Galton{Watson process with
immigration, dened by(
Xt =
PXt 1(1)
k=1 t;k;1 +   +
PXt 1(d)
k=1 t;k;d + "t; t 2 f1; 2; : : : ; Tg;
X0 = 0;
where ft;k;i; "t : t 2 f1; 2; : : : ; Tg; k 2 N; i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; dgg are independent
random vectors with nonnegative integer coordinates, such that ft;k;i : t 2
f1; 2; : : : ; Tg; k 2 Ng are identically distributed and f"; "t : t 2 f1; 2; : : : ; Tgg
are also identically distributed. Here the osprings 's correspond to the
new infections originated from an S-individual, while the immigrants "'s
correspond to new infections originated from the local population. Introduce
the generating functions
Ft(z) = Ez
Xt ; Gi(z) = Ez
1;1;i ; G(z) = (G1(z); : : : ; Gd(z)); H(z) = Ez
";
where xk = xk11 : : : x
kd
d . In the following boldface symbols x;y; z stand for
d-dimensional vectors.
It is easy to show that the recursion Ft(z) = Ft 1(G(z))H(z) holds. Let
Gk denote the k-fold iteration ofG, i.e.G0(z) = z andGt+1 = GtG. Then
an induction argument shows (see Quine [6]) that the generating function
of the t-th generation is
Ft(z) =
t 1Y
k=0
H(Gk(z)): (1)
Up to now we did not use any particular property of the branching
structure. However, note that in our case we have the followings. The
immigrants are always of type-1, thus the generating function is in fact a one-
variable function, i.e. H(z) = H(z1; : : : ; zd) = H(z1). We also have d = m+
k 1. For j = 1; 2; : : : ;m 1 every type-j particle has exactly one descendant
of type-(j + 1) (the individual already infected is still not infectious, only
getting one day older), thus Gj(z) = zj+1, while for j = m;m+ 1; : : : ;m+
k   1 the type-j individuals are already infecting and also getting one day
older, so Gj(z) = zj+1GS(z1), with GS(z) being the generating function of
the infected individuals on one day by a single infectious individual in S.
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Without the vector notation we have
Xt(1) =
m+k 1X
i=m
Xt 1(i)X
j=1
t;i;j + "t;
Xt(j) = Xt 1(j   1); j = 2; : : : ;m+ k   1;
where fi;j;t : i = m; : : : ;m + k   1; j 2 N; t = 1; 2; : : : ; Tg are iid random
variables with generating function GS .
2.2 Phase 2
Phase 2 starts with the infected vector XT arriving home. In this stage
there is no immigration, and since the infected individuals stay home there
is no point on registering the dierent types, and so instead of counting
the days we count the generation: Y0 is the number of individuals who are
infected by XT , Y1 is the number of individuals who are infected by Y0,
etc. That is the process now can be described by a single type Galton{
Watson process. However, the rst step is dierent, because the dierent
types have dierent meanings. Individuals of type-j, j  m, spend all
their infectious days in the home country, while individuals of type-(m+ j),
j = 1; 2; : : : ; k 1, spend only k j infectious days in the home country. Let
GF (z) denote the generating function of the infected individuals on one day
by a single infectious individual in the home country. Let Y0 be the number
of individuals who were infected by XT , then we have
Y0 =
mX
i=1
XT (i)
j=1
i;j +
m+k 1X
i=m+1
XT (i)
j=1
i;j ;
where fi;j : i = 1; 2; : : : ;m+k 1; j 2 Ng are independent random variables,
and fi;j : i = 1; 2; : : : ;m; j 2 Ng are iid with generating function GkF , and
for i 2 fm+1; : : : ;m+k 1g, fi;j : j 2 Ng are iid with generating function
Gm+k iF . Using the representation above for the generating function of Y0
we obtain
h(z) := EzY0 = FT (G
k
F (z); : : : ; G
k
F (z); G
k 1
F (z); : : : ; GF (z)): (2)
Now, all who were infected after this step spend their infectious days in
the home country, and so the process now is a simple single type Galton{
Watson process with ospring generating function g(z) = GkF (z), starting
from random initial state Y0.
If this simple Galton{Watson process is critical or subcritical, i.e. g0(1) 
1, then the process dies out almost surely, regardless to the distribution of
Y0, that is there is no major epidemic in this case. In the supercritical
case, when g0(1) > 1, the probability that starting from a single individual
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the process dies out is the unique root in (0; 1) of the equation g(x) = x.
Let q denote this extinction probability. The process starting from Y0 dies
out if all the Y0 branches dies out, which has probability q
Y0 . That is the
probability of extinction of the whole process is
Pfextinctiong = EqY0 = h(q); (3)
with h as in (2).
3 Computations for the European Football Cham-
pionship 2012
3.1 Risk of measles outbreak depends on the results of the
football games
In this section we apply the results to the measles epidemic in Ukraine
during the 2012 UEFA European Football Championship. For illustratory
purposes, we haves chosen France as a prototype for describing the results.
In fact, as being amongst the four favourites for the European championship
title [7], France was likely to be amongst the teams with the most supporters,
while having low vaccination coverage against measles, posing an elevated
risk of imported epidemic caused by supporter cases after Euro 2012. We
compare the following three scenarios, one of which is the real situation
in Euro 2012, while the two others are hypothetical cases representing the
extremes for France by means of total time spent in Ukraine (see also Fig. 1):
(a) France is eliminated in the group stage, thus playing only three games
in Ukraine between June 11 and June 19 (hypothetical case);
(b) France nishes second in the group and is eliminated in the quarternals,
playing four games in Ukraine between June 11 and June 23 (this is what
actually happened);
(c) France nishes second in the group, and gets into the nal, thus playing
six games between June 11 and July 1, all in Ukraine (hypothetical
case).
We assume that the supporter population is staying in Ukraine as long
as the team continues to play games. The total length of stay would be the
length of games plus one extra day due to international travel, and thus, in
the three cases we have T = 10 (a), T = 14 (b) and T = 21 (c).
For our computations we set m = 9, k = 9 [8]. Since measles is generally
rare in Europe, the eective reproduction number in France RF = g
0(1) is
determined by the basic reproduction number R0 of measles and the eective
vaccination coverage vF in France (e.g. the fraction of population that is
6
Figure 1: The movement of France during Euro 2012 and the dates of games.
The solid arrow corresponds to the group stage, the dashed arrow corre-
sponds to additional games in scenarios (b) and (c), the dot-dashed arrow
corresponds to the hypothetical case of getting into the nal (scenario (c)).
The dotted arrows represent the movement of Italy (chosen randomly for
illustratory purposes) during the tournament.
immunized and protected) due to RF = R0(1 vF ). The basic reproduction
number R0 is estimated between 12 and 18. For computations we use R0 =
15. Thus RF is realistically assumed to be in the range 1{3 [9, 10, 11,
12]. The contact pattern within the supporter group might be dierent
from the general population, but still the eective reproduction number
in Ukraine RS = k = kG
0
S(1) is expected to be of the same magnitude
as RF providing a reasonable range for . Parameter  = H
0(1), which
represents the expected number of daily infected individuals infected by
members of the local population is the most dicult to estimate, as this
is given by a combination of several factors: the morbidity of measles in
Ukraine during the tournament, the contact patterns between and within
local and supporter populations, the size of the supporter group and the
level of susceptibility in this group. We scanned a large domain [0; 0:125]
for . A person having measles changes his mixing and contact patterns
due to the infection, but it should be noted that generally such a change
in social behaviour is accounted for the estimate of R0. Here we assume
that individuals in the host country, home country and visitor populations
modify their social behaviour similarly after contracting the disease, thus
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our three key parameters , , RF are all proportional to R0.
By the nature of the immigration and the ospring distributions it is nat-
ural to assume that these are Poisson, or compound Poisson distributed. We
calculate the extinction probabilities in two cases: when the ospring and
immigration distributions are Poisson distributions and when they are neg-
ative binomial distributions. In the Appendix we explicitly calculate some
relevant quantities. We assume that the expectations of the total number of
daily new infections from the local population (), the expectation of daily
new infections by one infectious individual from the supporter population
(), and the expectation of daily new infections by one infectious individ-
ual in the home country () are known, and choose the parameters of the
generating functions accordingly. Note that RF = 9.
Assuming that both the immigration and the ospring distributions are
Poisson, we have
H(z) = e(z 1); GS(z) = e(z 1); GF (z) = e(z 1); and g(z) = e9(z 1):
A random variableX has negative binomial distribution with parameters
r > 0 and p 2 (0; 1), if PfX = kg =  k+r 1r 1 (1   p)rpk, k = 0; 1; 2; : : :,
where the binomial coecient is dened by
 
k+r 1
r 1

= (k+r 1)(k+r 2)rk! .
The generating function is
EzX =

1  p
1  pz
r
;
and so the expectation is EX = rp=(1  p). In the special case, when r = 1
we obtain the geometric distribution. Assuming geometric distribution for
the immigration and the one-day infections
H(z) = [1 +   z] 1 ; GS(z) = [1 +    z] 1 ; GF (z) = [1 +    z] 1 ;
(the parameters are chosen to make the corresponding expectations to be
;  and  respectively), and using that GkF = g we necessarily have
g(z) = [1 +    z] 9 :
Figure 2 shows that the risk in scenario T = 21 can be twice as large as
in scenario T = 10.
Comparing Figures 2(a) and 2(b) we see that there is not much dierence
in the behaviour of the extinction probabilities. In the Poissonian case the
extinction probability is slightly larger than in the negative binomial case,
corresponding to the same parameter values. Therefore in the following we
assume the Poissonian setup.
The extinction probabilities cannot be computed explicitly. This is be-
cause q, the probability of extinction starting from one individual cannot be
calculated explicitly neither in the Poissonian, nor in the negative binomial
8
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Figure 2: The probability of a major epidemic as the function of the eective
reproduction number in France in the Poissonian case (a) and in the negative
binomial case (b). The parameters are  = 0:04;  = 0:27. The solid curve
is for T = 21, the dashed is for T = 14, the dot-dashed is for T = 10.
case. We numerically solve the equation for dierent values of  running
from 0:111 up to 0:334, i.e. RF varies in the range 1   3. (Recall that the
expected value of osprings in Phase 2 is 9.) Then we substitute these
values into the explicitly known generating function h, given in (2).
3.2 Vaccination and the risk of epidemics after Euro 2012
We compare the eectiveness of three potential vaccination strategies in
reducing the risk of imported major epidemic:
(i) vaccination of the general population in France;
(ii) vaccination of the general population in Ukraine;
(iii) vaccination of football-associated travellers between France and Euro
2012 venues.
To consider (i), note that increasing the vaccination rate vF decreases
each of the parameters in our model. That is 9 = RF = R0(1   vF ),
 = 1(1  vF ), and  = 1(1  vF ). We plotted the risk of major epidemic
p as a function of vF in Figure 3.
Figure 3(a) shows a milder measles epidemics in Ukraine, and Figure 3(b)
corresponds to a more severe situation. We may notice that it is particularly
worthwhile to increase the immunization rate in France if the epidemic is
severe in Ukraine, because in this case we could observe a steep decline in
the risk as vF increased beyond 0.84 (which is, roughly speaking, consistent
with the reported present coverage in the country). Increasing vF has the
benet of decreasing the risk of outbreaks by imported cases unrelated to
Euro 2012.
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Figure 3: The probability of a major epidemic as the function of the im-
munization rate in France. The parameters are 1 = 1:8, and 1 = 0:1 in
Figure 3(a) and 1 = 0:5 in Figure 3(b). The solid curve is for T = 21, the
dashed is for T = 14, the dot-dashed is for T = 10.
On the other hand, elevating the vaccination level vU of the local Ukrain-
ian population decreases  = 2(1 vU ). The current value of vU is reported
to be about 0.5 [13]. Given the dierence between the total populations of
Ukraine and France, increasing vF by one unit requires the same amount of
vaccines as increasing vU by 1.4 units. However, the computations show that
p is much less sensitive to vU than to vF (Figure 5), because small reduction
in the risk of infection during travel may only slightly reduce the imported
cases.
Targeted vaccination of football visitors reduces both  = 1(1 vT ) and
 = 1(1 vT ) where vT is the level of immunization in S (i.e. in the absence
of targeted vaccination of travellers, it is assumed that vT = vF ). Figure
6 shows the eciency of this strategy in the case of a milder and a more
severe Ukrainian measles epidemic. If the vaccination history was perfectly
known, elevating from 0.84 to 0.94 would be achieved by vaccinating 10%
of the travellers from France (targeting the unvaccinated ones). Such an
intervention can halve the risk with relatively small eorts. It should be
noted that elevating the coverage vT would require the smallest number of
doses (as compared to conducting mass vaccinations in other scenarios) as
vaccinating the supporters requires only a couple of thousands of doses.
4 Comparison with Euro 2008
In contrast to Euro 2012, here we descriptively review the measles outbreaks
which are likely associated with Euro 2008 and other mass gathering events.
The 2008 UEFA European Football Championship (Euro 2008) took place
in Austria and Switzerland from 7 to 29 June 2008. Signicant measles
outbreaks were reported in both of the host countries before the champi-
onship [14]. However, that situation was dierent from this year's in several
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Figure 4: The solid curve is the expectation of the total number of imported
cases in scenario (b) in the function of the immunization rate in France. At
least with probability 0.75 the number of imported cases are smaller than
the dashed curve, and with probability 0.9 are smaller than the dot-dashed
curve (calculated from Chebyshev's inequality). The parameter values are
the same as in Figure 3(b).
aspects. First of all, the vaccination coverage is much higher in Switzer-
land and Austria than in Ukraine, and consequently, as the morbidity data
show, the measles outbreak in 2012 in Ukraine is of signicantly larger scale
than the one in the two host countries four years ago [15]. It is also likely
that Euro 2008 did not elevate the relative number of travellers as much
as Euro 2012 in Ukraine as the two host countries of Euro 2008 are close
to several of the participating countries and most host cities are popular
tourist destinations, hosting a large number of visitors even without the
football championship. As it has been pointed out in [16], a large scale mass
gathering can even discourage regular tourists to visit the given cities to
avoid the crowdedness, as happened in 2008 during the Olympic Games in
Beijing. The media reported a similar phenomenon in London during the
2012 Olympic Games. In other cases (for example Sydney 2000), there was
a surge of travellers, and we can assume the same for Ukraine as well.
For Euro 2008 we chose Germany as the German national team reached
the nal of the championship, which means that their supporters spent 21
days in Austria and Switzerland, and WHO reports a suboptimal coverage of
83-89% for the second dose of measles-containing vaccine in Germany [17].
Taking into account the number of measles cases in Austria/Switzerland
in 2008 and in Ukraine in 2012, and the population of these countries, we
can expect the parameter  to be approximately ten times smaller for Euro
2008 than for Euro 2012. Assuming Poisson distribution, calculating with
 = 0:004 and  = 0:27, formula (4) says that the probability of no imported
infection is 0:92, that is the probability of major epidemic is less than 0:08,
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Figure 5: The probability of a major epidemic as the function of the im-
munization rate in Ukraine. The parameters are RF = 2; 1 = 1:8, and
1 = 0:1. The solid curve is for T = 21, the dashed is for T = 14, the
dot-dashed is for T = 10.
which is signicantly smaller than the probabilities for Euro 2012.
Data from 2008 show that in several participating countries (e.g. France,
Germany, Spain, Switzerland) there were increases in the number of measles
cases after Euro 2008 compared to the same period of the year in 2007
[18, 19, 20, 21]. However, based on available data, a direct link cannot be
established between Euro 2008 and these outbreaks.
5 Other sports related mass gatherings
As pointed out in [22], the last two European football championships are
not unique in the sense that curiously, the football championships seem to
coincide with measles outbreaks. Apart from the two cases mentioned above,
during the FIFA World Cup 2006 a large measles outbreak was ongoing in
Germany (host country), while there was an outbreak in South Africa during
FIFA World Cup 2010. Furthermore, the Winter Olympic Games in 2010,
held in Vancouver, were followed by a measles outbreak in British Columbia
of about 80 cases following three separate importations, two of which were
linked to the Olympic Games [23].
After Euro 2012, another sports related mass gathering event followed,
the Summer Olympic Games in London. There were several alerts about
measles in connection with the Olympic Games [24, 25]. However, there
are several dierences between football championships and the Olympic
Games. Football championships have a special tournament structure and
huge groups of fans moving together following their national teams, which
is not typical for the Olympic Games. Football championships are hosted
by several cities, while the Olympic Games are held (apart from some mi-
12
(a)
0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Level of immunization among football-related travellers
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
o
fm
ajo
re
pi
de
m
ic
p
vT
(b)
0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Level of immunization among football-related travellers
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
o
fm
ajo
re
pi
de
m
ic
p
vT
Figure 6: The probability of a major epidemic as the function of the immu-
nization rate in the supporter group. The parameters are RF = 2; 1 = 1:8,
and 1 = 0:1 in Figure 6(a) and 1 = 0:5 in Figure 6(b). The solid curve is
for T = 21, the dashed is for T = 14, the dot-dashed is for T = 10.
nor events) in one city. This means that our model ts rather for sport
events which have the tournament structure like football World Cup and
European Championship. With an ecient monitoring after Euro 2012, it
may be possible to rene our parameters and prepare more realistic risk
assessments using our approach for the forthcoming major championships
such as FIFA World Cup 2014 in Brazil and Euro 2016 in France. The low
vaccination rate and the recent and ongoing measles epidemics in France
[26, 27] suggest that there will be a risk of measles during Euro 2016 as well.
6 Discussion
We constructed and applied a stochastic model to investigate the risk of
imported epidemics caused by visitors returning from a sports related mass
gathering event to their home countries after the tournament. For the sake
of simplicity, we considered a single supporter population, while a realistic
situation of course involves many additional complicating factors including
movements within the host country and interactions between supporters and
local population. We introduced a discrete time Markov chain model with
two phases, which is an adaptation of a multitype Galton{Watson process
with immigration as a mathematical model, and derived several analyti-
cal relations for the expectations, variances and probabilities regarding key
aspects of the process.
We applied our theoretical model to the measles epidemics in Ukraine
during the 2012 UEFA European Football Championship, selecting the na-
tional team of France for illustratory purposes. Due to the uncertainties in
social parameters, we considered a wide interval for the transmission rate
between local and visitor populations. Our approach clearly demonstrated
that the travel patterns depend on the schedule and the results of the foot-
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ball games, showing that the probability of a major measles epidemic in
France could be greatly elevated by the successful outcomes of French games.
Namely, the more successful the national team is in a football tournament,
the higher the risk of a post-tournament imported measles epidemic would
be in the home country. More importantly, we have compared dierent vac-
cination strategies and our study theoretically demonstrated that the risk
of an imported measles epidemic by the visitors to Euro 2012 and other
mass gatherings would be most eciently reduced by vaccinating the visi-
tors (travellers). Of course, vaccinating the entire French population would
also be eective (which actually prevents the country from not only the risk
from Euro 2012 but also any other epidemics to be imported), but in theory
this option requires us to secure millions of doses. The optimal control by ef-
fectively targeting travellers is novel both in practical and theoretical sense,
because the condensed interventions among travellers have been shown not
to be very eective in preventing an epidemic (e.g. pandemic inuenza) as
long as there are arbitrarily large number of travellers. We have shown that
it is worth focusing on travellers when the number is nite and in the man-
ageable order. Unvaccinated travellers would likely be covered within a few
thousand doses, and thus, any country to respond to the associated risk is
suggested to consider this option.
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Appendix
We compute explicitly the expectation and variance of the overall number
of infectious individuals arriving home after day T , i.e. Z :=
P17
i=1XT (i),
and also we compute the probability that there is no imported infection,
i.e. PfZ = 0g. To do this we compute the generating function FT (z) given
in (1) and then we use that
P fZ = 0g = FT (0);EZ =
17X
i=1
@FT
@zi
(1);
VarZ =
X
i;j

@2FT
@zi@zj
(1) EXT (i)EXT (j) + i;jEXT (i)

;
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with i;j = 1 for i = j, and 0 otherwise. Note that one minus the probability
of no imported infection is a trivial upper bound for the probability of a
major epidemic, and it is independent of .
Assuming Poissonian ospring and immigration distribution, we have
the following.
(i) T = 10: In this case everything is relatively easy to compute. For
example, there is no imported infection if and only if each day the number
of immigrants is 0, which has probability e 10. We have
P fZ = 0g = e 10; EZ = (10 + ); VarZ = (10 + 3 + 2);
(ii) T = 14:
P fZ = 0g = e 14; EZ = (14 + 15);
VarZ = (14 + 45 + 552);
(iii) T = 21:
P fZ = 0g = e 17 4(1 e 9); EZ = (17 + 72 + 102);
VarZ = (17 + 144 + 5582 + 2003 + 464):
(4)
In the negative binomial case for the dierent scenarios we have
(i) T = 10:
P fZ = 0g = (1 + ) 10; EZ = (10 + );
VarZ = (10(1 + ) + 2(2 + ) + (3 + 2));
(ii) T = 14:
P fZ = 0g = (1 + ) 14; EZ = (14 + 15);
VarZ = (14(1 + ) + 15(3 + 2) + 2(70 + 55));
(iii) T = 21:
P fZ = 0g = (1 + ) 17

1 +   
(1 + )9
 4
;
EZ = (17 + 72 + 102);
VarZ = 
 
17(1 + ) + 72(2 + ) + 62(105 + 88)
+ 103(23 + 18) + 4(66 + 46)

;
Also note that in both cases the variance is large compared to the ex-
pectation, implying that the probability of no imported cases is large.
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